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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1911 
___________ 
 
JAMES McLAUGHLIN, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LT. HART, Property Room Supervisor, Zone Lieutenant, Medical;  
 NELSON IANNUZI, Certified Registered Nurse Practitioner, Medical,  
 a/k/a Toney Iannuzi; SGT. MEYERS, Property Room Sergeant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-13-cv-02851) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 30, 2016 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and GARTH1, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 21, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
                                              
1 The Honorable Leonard I. Garth participated in the decision in this case, but died before 
the opinion could be filed.  This opinion is filed by a quorum of the court.  28 U.S.C. § 46 
and Third Circuit IOP 12.1(b). 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Appellant James McLaughlin appeals from a district court order granting the 
Appellees’ two motions for summary judgment.  Because we conclude that this appeal 
presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 James McLaughlin, a prisoner at SCI – Frackville acting pro se, has filed this 
action asserting various violations of his constitutional rights in connection with the 
prison’s alleged repeated failures to provide him with appropriate orthopedic shoes and 
related foot care.  McLaughlin sued correctional officers Hart and Myers, who are 
employed at SCI – Mahanoy, where McLaughlin is now housed.  He has also sued 
Nelson “Toney” Iannuzi, a Nurse Practitioner at the prison who allegedly displayed 
deliberate indifference to McLaughlin’s serious medical needs and denied him prescribed 
footwear in response to grievances McLaughlin filed.  McLaughlin’s claims focus in 
significant part around a number of grievances he filed with prison officials.   
The correctional officers and Iannuzi separately moved for summary judgment.  
The Magistrate Judge, in a very thorough 41-page Report and Recommendation, 
analyzed the facts of this matter in detail and recommended that the motions be granted.  
The District Court granted the Motions for Summary Judgment over McLaughlin’s 
objections.  McLaughlin now appeals the District Court’s judgment. 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of 
orders granting motions for summary judgment is plenary.  See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 
F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 
3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 In support of his appeal, McLaughlin contends that the Magistrate Judge and 
District Court “misapprehended” a number of his grievances and thus reached incorrect 
conclusions regarding his failure to exhaust.  He also states his disbelief that his 
grievances could be dismissed for missing documentation.  Review of the Report and 
Recommendation and the record, however, suggests that the Magistrate Judge fully 
understood the grievances at issue.  Moreover, the Magistrate Judge properly found that, 
in the vast majority of instances, McLaughlin failed to meet the procedural requirements 
necessary to exhaust his claims.  See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006) 
(holding that an inmate must comply with all established procedural requirements of the 
grievance review process in order to fully exhaust an issue).  McLaughlin failed to appeal 
grievances, failed to timely appeal grievances, and failed to include required paperwork 
with his grievances.  The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that McLaughlin did not 
present an evidentiary response to the documented showing by the defendants that his 
claims relating to the majority of his grievances were procedurally defaulted.2 
                                              
2 The one grievance that McLaughlin properly procedurally appealed through to the final 
level of review was appropriately denied because McLaughlin had a pair of boots he had 
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 The District Court also correctly found that McLaughlin offered no real 
evidentiary support for either his First Amendment retaliation or Eighth Amendment 
deliberate indifference to serious medical need claims, and that the defendants in this case 
marshaled substantial evidence to show that the decisions to deny McLaughlin’s requests 
were reasonable and based upon Department of Corrections (“DOC”) policy.  This 
dispute centers around McLaughlin’s suggestion that because he injured his ankle in 
2007, and again in 2012, he was somehow entitled to circumvent DOC policy in order to 
purchase the footwear he desired from a vendor that he selected.  However, the evidence 
shows only that McLaughlin was prevented from purchasing these items from an 
unapproved vendor, not that he was prevented from obtaining appropriate footwear, or 
footwear that was approved by his doctors at various points of time.  In other words, the 
evidence suggests that McLaughlin’s own insistence on trying to purchase the items he 
wished from a vendor who was unavailable to him caused his own problems, if any 
existed.   
 This is not the proper fodder for a viable Eighth Amendment claim, as the District 
Court properly held.  This is not a situation where a prison official knew of a prisoner’s 
need for medical treatment but refused to provide it, delayed necessary medical treatment 
for a non-medical reason, or prevented a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended 
medical treatment.  See Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  To the 
                                                                                                                                                  
received at SCI – Frackville which he had indicated to the medical staff at SCI – 
Mahanoy were adequate. 
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contrary, prison officials were willing to allow McLaughlin to purchase shoes from an 
approved vendor or the commissary pursuant to DOC policy.  Correctional officer 
defendants Hart and Meyers are not medical professionals, and their entire involvement 
in this claim appears to be limited to preventing McLaughlin from shopping at his desired 
vendor “Mike’s.”  This was done pursuant to DOC policy, however.  The District Court 
was correct to conclude that there is no evidence that those policies, or the enforcement 
of them, was designed to prevent McLaughlin from obtaining the footwear he desired and 
that his doctors recommended. 
 The Magistrate Judge also correctly indicated that the evidence is even sparer with 
respect to defendant Iannuzi, who is the only remaining medical defendant in this case.  
McLaughlin seems to contend that Iannuzi denied him the “medical treatment” of the 
acquisition of high-top sneakers with ankle support.  However, Iannuzi explained, 
without dispute, that although medical staff may write orders to recommend orthopedic 
shoes, they are not involved in the purchase of footwear, which must be approved by 
prison officials.  Iannuzi and other medical officials actually had no objection to 
McLaughlin procuring the footwear he wanted, and in fact took steps to help facilitate 
this purchase by issuing orders approving the purchase of high-top sneakers from an 
outside vendor.  Summary judgment was appropriate on McLaughlin’s Eighth 
Amendment claims. 
 McLaughlin’s First Amendment claims fare no better.  A prisoner claiming that 
prison officials have retaliated against him for exercising his rights under the First 
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Amendment must prove that, inter alia, he suffered an “adverse action” at their hands.  
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  However, defendants can prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that they “would have made the same decision absent the 
protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to penological interest.”  Id. at 334.  
Here, the record reveals a clear legitimate penological basis underlying the decision to 
deny McLaughlin’s request to purchase high-top sneakers or other desired footwear from 
an unapproved outside vendor, or from an outside vendor when the items were available 
through the commissary: the need to control items entering the prison.  This is why the 
DOC maintains a specific vendor and commissary policy.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference 
in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed 
to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”).  This 
policy did not prevent McLaughlin from obtaining the items that he wanted, and that 
were approved by medical personnel; the policy simply dictated the manner in which he 
needed to obtain them.  The District Court properly found that McLaughlin did not 
establish that enforcement of this across-the-board policy, which did not actually 
foreclose McLaughlin’s purchase, was motivated by McLaughlin’s protected conduct 
(grievance or otherwise), and he has offered nothing to show that the defendants’ stated 
penological basis for denying his purchase requests was a smokescreen.  Summary 
judgment was, therefore, appropriate. 
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III. 
 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question.  
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order granting the defendants 
summary judgment on McLaughlin’s complaint.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
Because of the disposition of this appeal, the Motion Requesting Docket Entries is 
denied. 
 
